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Abstract 
Using the CBS-micro survey, ethnic and gender wage differentials in the Netherlands 
are examined between native Dutch labourers and 7 ethnic minority groups that are 
highly differentiated in their human capital endowment and immigration history. 
Estimations indicate that wage discrimination occurs mainly on the basis of their ethnic 
background rather than gender. Moroccans suffer the largest wage gap due to 
discrimination. This result is likely an indication of employer’s response on the 
deteroriating image of Moroccans in the Netherlands in recent years. Also, Eastern-
European and non-European workers that are composed by more refugees and other 
recent immigrants are disfavoured, so are Caribbean and Indonesian men. Immigrants 
from the EU-countries rarely face wage discrimination.  
 
In this research, data has been used from LSO 1997 (Wage Structure Survey) of 
Statistics Netherlands, which is available on-site at the Centre for Research of 
Economic Micro-data (CEREM). The views expressed in this paper do not 
necessarily reflect the policies of Statistics Netherlands. 
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1. Introduction 
World wide, numerous studies have documented that women and ethnic minorities are 
vulnerable groups in the labour market. The weak labour market position of these 
groups is observable in the form of their concentration in unattractive jobs/sectors, low 
participation rates, and relatively low earnings. Some part of the employment- and 
earnings-gap can be explained by observable skill differences but a large part of this 
gap remains unexplained and is often attributed to labour market discrimination. 
In the Netherlands, the sharply increasing participation rate of (married) women has 
drawn considerable attention from researchers from the 1980s onwards but immigrant 
women have remained outside of researcher’s sight. Economic research on immigrants 
has focussed mainly on the labour market position of male immigrants. Female 
immigrants are simply neglected due to two main raisons. Firstly, the composition of 
immigrant workers have been dominated by (usually male) ‘guest workers’ arrived in 
the 1960s and 1970s. Secondly, the participation rate of immigrant women from the 
Mediterranean source countries of ‘guest workers’ such as Turkey and Morocco has 
been considerable low. Consequently the number of immigrant women in data sets that 
are scarcely available was too small to conduct statistical analyses. This paper studies 
wage differentials between native Dutch workers and seven ethnic minority groups by 
gender with an emphasis on whether ethnic minority women are double disadvantaged, 
using a large cross-section data of Statistics Netherlands (CBS) from 1997, called LSO. 
Other than earlier studies, this paper considers both successful immigrants and 
disadvantaged immigrant groups as well as ‘new’ immigrant groups1. 
The paper starts with a brief overview of the labour market position of ethnic minorities 
in the Netherlands. In section 3, models to estimate earnings equations, data used and a 
decomposition technique for the identification of gender- and ethnic wage gap are 
presented respectively. The estimated results on the components of earnings 
differentials between men and women as well as between native Dutch and ethnic 
minority groups are presented. The paper ends with conclusions.  
2. Ethnic Minorities: a brief overview 
This paper distinguishes seven ethnic minority groups: first group covers ethnic 
minorities2 from European Union (EU) countries immigrants that consist of both earlier 
‘guest workers from Mediterranean area (Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal) and those 
from other member countries of the EU. Second group covers ethnic minorities from 
Eastern European countries mainly composed by ‘guest workers’ from former 
Yugoslavia and early and late refugees. Third group covers all those who do not belong 
                                                 
1 Research in the Netherlands has focused on immigrants who have a disadvantaged labour market position and who 
have been a target group of minorities policy designed since 1979, such as Surinamese, Antillean, South European, 
Turkish and Moroccan immigrants. For the first time, this paper also provides information about the wages of 
immigrants who have a similar labour market position as native Dutch workers and about the wages of recent 
immigrant groups. 
2 The notion ethnic minority here refers to a broad classification of non-native Dutch people, which is the official 
definition and called allochtoon in Dutch. According to this definition, anyone is considered allochtoon if s/he is 
born in the country of origin mentioned or if s/he has a mother or father who was born outside of the Netherlands. 
The official definition is used for data collection through which the identification of first and second-generation 
immigrants as well as children of immigrants becomes impossible. 
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to the groups mentioned here, and who are to small in numbers to be distinguished as a 
separate group. Turkish and Moroccan workers are categorised as fifth and sixth 
groups. Seventh group is the sum of those who are from the Dutch Antilles and 
Suriname, a former Dutch colony. This group is called Caribbeans henceforth. Workers 
originated in former Dutch colony, Indonesia compose the last group.   
The labour market position of these ethnic minorities groups is characterised by strong 
differences and also similarities, just as their migration history. Workers from EU 
countries posses comparable labour market characteristics as native Dutch workers. Up 
to now, little is known about workers from the categories of Eastern European and non-
European that possibly include many refugees3. This paper provides novel information 
about these groups. Immigrants from former colonies often speak the Dutch language 
before they arrive. They are also more familiar with Dutch society. However, we still 
observe significant differences within this category. Indonesian people immigrated 
right after WW II and their labour market position has strongly improved while 
Surinamese (most who entered after 1975), Dutch Antilleans and Arubans have less 
favourable positions, even though they have experienced noticeable improvements. 
Immigrants who initially arrived as guest workers also strongly differ in their social 
career in the Netherlands. The Southern Europeans – Italians, Spanish, Portuguese, 
Greeks, and Yugoslavs, and their descendants - have improved their position 
significantly while Turks and Moroccans still occupy an unfavourable position 
(Lucassen and Penninx, 1997: 141-165; Van Ours and Veenman, 1999). Related to 
these differences, policy attention and research concentrate mainly on Moroccans, 
Turks, Surinamese, Antilleans and Arubans.  
The low qualification level of ethnic minorities causes disadvantages in job level, 
labour market participation, earnings and unemployment. Especially notable is the low 
schooling level of Moroccan and Turkish workers. More than 40% of the 
Moroccan/Turkish labour force in the Netherlands only has a primary school education. 
Skill-upgrading takes places across the entire labour force and appears to be stronger 
for ethnic minority groups, especially Turks and Moroccans (Zorlu & Hartog 2002). 
Still, the educational gap for ethnic minorities is dramatic (but excepted for Antilleans). 
The poor educational achievement of second-generation immigrants is closely related 
to the age at arrival in the Netherlands (Van Ours and Veenman, 1999). Those who 
arrived young successfully participate in the Dutch educational system, while 
youngsters arriving in the middle of their school career have difficulties ‘catching-up’ 
with their classmates. Especially young people from non-Dutch-speaking countries 
who must first learn the Dutch language, in a handicapped parental environment with 
poor language skills and limited knowledge about Dutch society and educational 
system. Similar to first generation immigrants, the education gap is largest for Turks 
and Moroccans and smallest for Antilleans. 
Lack of human capital explains only a part of the low employment level of immigrants. 
Van Ours and Veenman (1999) report on regressions of labour earnings for male 
household heads working a least 30 hours a week in 1994 controlling for education, 
occupation, employment in a supervisory position, work experience, age, and length of 
stay in the Netherlands. The factors explain a large share of the earnings gap with 
                                                 
3 Refugees are not identifiable in labour force data. 
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native Dutch workers: 98% for Turks, 87% for Surinamese, 81% for Antilleans and 
78% for Moroccans. Again, at first sight there is no relation to cultural or language 
distance. Kee (1993) uses small samples of these immigrant groups in 1984-1985, a 
period of high unemployment, for a deeper analysis of wage differences (for male 
household heads aged 18 to 65). For Turks and Moroccans, schooling and (potential) 
experience in the home country have no effect on wages. For Antilleans and 
Surinamese, schooling in the home country does raise earnings, at about the same rate 
as schooling obtained in the Netherlands. For all groups of immigrants, schooling in the 
Netherlands is rewarded less than for Dutch natives. Also for all immigrant groups, 
experience in the Netherlands is more highly rewarded than experience in the home 
country. But only for Surinamese is there a return to home country experience. The 
effect of Dutch language proficiency is not very well established. Simple dummies for 
self-reported proficiency are not significant in OLS regressions. Estimates generate no 
transparent results although many interaction effects with schooling and experience 
come out (Kee, 1993). 
3. The Empirical model 
Wage differentials between men and women as well as between native Dutch and 
ethnic minority labour for men and women are estimated separately. The standard 
procedure, to identify these wage differentials, is to estimate Mincerian wage functions 
by OLS and decompose wage differentials by the Oaxaca & Blinder method (Oaxaca 
1973, Blinder 1973). However, Heckman (1979) and Lee (1976) show that 
conventional OLS estimates based on a subsample provide inconsistent estimates of the 
population parameters if this subsample is not a random sample of the original sample. 
If the sample selectivity occurs, the error terms of selection and wage equations are 
correlated. In this case, Heckman & Lee procedure suggests a consistent two-step 
estimates in which the selectivity coefficient (lambda) obtained by the estimation of a 
qualitative selection rule is included in wage regressions that may simply be estimated 
by conventional OLS technique.   
The selectivity may be a serious problem for the data used. Since the focus here is on 
ethnic minority groups to which the Dutch language is not common and in which 
various languages are spoken, it is likely that people who do not speak Dutch or have a 
poor command of the language will have a higher chance of not being observed. The 
productivity of those who are included in this non-randomly selected sample may be 
different compared to that of those who are not included in the sample. That may cause 
a bias to the estimated coefficients of the earnings functions (Heckman 1979). To 
control for a possible sample selection bias, Heckman & Lee procedure is applied.  
The sample selection rule is given by the following qualitative response equation. 
 *ij j ij ijy zα υ= +         (1) 
where ijz  are a vector of the exogenous variables for individual i from subsample j 
which are thought to determine whether wages are observed or unobserved, jα are 
corresponding coefficients, and ijυ  is random residuals which are assumed to be 
( )0,1N . Individuals are indexed by 1, 2,...,i n=  and both ethnic groups and gender by 
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1, 2,...,j k= . *ijy  is the outcome of the selection rule and is given by dichotomous 
variable ijy  
*1 if 0
   0,  otherwise
ij ijy y= >
=        (2) 
wages of individuals are observed when the selection rule is satisfied  
ln    1ij j ij ij ijw x iff yβ ε= + =       (3) 
where ln ijw is the natural logarithm of weekly earnings, ijx  are vectors of exogenous 
regressors determining productivity of individual i from subsample j, jβ is a vector of 
corresponding coefficients and ijε  is random residuals with ( )0,ij Nε σ  . The 
residuals of selection and wage equations are assumed to be jointly bivariate normally 
distributed, such that ( ),ij ijcorr ε υ ρ=  
Estimation of this equation by conventional OLS will provide inconsistent estimates 
because the truncation leads to ( ) 0ijE ε ≠ .  
A regression function with the truncation may be written as 
( ) ( )ln 1ij ij j ij ij ij j ijE w y x E zβ ε υ α= = + > −     (4) 
In this case, the Heckman selection model suggests two-step consistent and 
asymptotically efficient estimates: estimate the selection equation by probit model and 
include the ijλ , the non-selection hazard (or inverse Mill’s ratio) obtained from the 
probit estimates in the regression model (Heckman 1976). This selectivity corrected 
regression model can be rewritten as (Greene 1997, pp. 976-978) 
( )ln 1ij ij j ij j ijE w y xβ δ λ= = +      (5) 
where the selectivity correction variable is given as ( ) ( )ij j ij j ijz zλ φ α α= Φ ; ( ).φ  is 
the standard normal density and ( ).Φ  is the standard normal distribution function.  
Including a disturbance term in equation (5), the full regression function can be written 
as  
( )ln 1ij ij j ij j ij ijE w y x uβ δ λ= = + +      (6) 
We estimate the selection and earnings model given by equations (1) and (6) by the full 
maximum likelihood procedure as suggested by the Heckman selection model to obtain 
consistent parameter estimates for wage functions, which are our interest.  
Data 
For the analyses, we use the large and representative micro data (N=148948) collected 
by Statistics Netherlands (CBS), and called LSO 1997. This data is a combination of 
three separate data sets: the employment and wages survey (an employer’s survey), the 
administrative data for insured people (VZA) which provide administrative earnings 
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information and the labour force survey (EBB). Unemployed and self-employed 
individuals are not included in the data since the employers’ survey and VZA are taken 
as a base. 
The LSO data set from 1997 is the first large representative micro data set including 
enough observations on ethnic minorities in the Netherlands to satisfactorily estimate 
separate earnings functions. Ethnic origin is defined by the birthplace of the respondent 
or by one of the parents’ birthplace. Note that this definition is very broad and also 
covers children born in the Netherlands of immigrant parent(s). From the data it is 
impossible to identify birthplace, education acquired abroad and the proficiency of the 
Dutch language. 
The earnings of the employed labour force are defined to be the dependent variable in 
the earnings equation. People who are not able to work (N=7513) and people who have 
a job but are seeking another job (N=3367) do not enter the wage equation. Thus, only 
equilibrium wages are considered, assuming that the population of job seekers is not 
randomly selected. However, these two groups enter the selection equation4. The 
former exclusion is conventional (and inevitable), the latter is novel. 
Earnings of workers are defined as weekly earnings, which is calculated by dividing 
gross monthly earnings plus any bonus by four weeks. Seven education levels are given 
in the data and are included in the earnings functions as dummy variables in place of 
years of education because the latter does not take into account possible quality 
differences across education types. The lowest education is unfinished primary 
education, and the highest level is university education. The years of education is 
calculated on the basis of these seven education levels to approximate potential 
experience. Experience is ‘potential’ in that it is calculated as the respondents’ age 
minus the number of schooling years minus five. Tenure indicates the years worked for 
current employer. Dummy variables are created for five occupation levels, residence in 
each of the four largest cities where immigrants are concentrated, marriage status, and 
public sector employment. Full-time and part-time employment indicators are also 
defined, as dummy variables, while flexible jobs serve as the reference category. Also 
six dummies are generated for having one or more children aged between 0-5, 6-11 and 
12-17 years.  For the estimations, sixteen sub-samples are constructed on basis of 
gender and ethnicity. In addition to Dutch workers, seven ethnic minority groups are 
distinguished. Both ethnic minorities who have disadvantaged position and who are 
successful, are included in this paper. As mentioned in section 2, there are significant 
differences between ethnic minority groups, which are characterised by their social, 
economic, demographic background and immigration history. To understand these 
differences across groups and to provide information for policy considerations, the 
entire sample is divided up into eight sub-samples on the basis of ethnic background as 
mentioned in section 2.  
Table A.1 gives the descriptive statistics for all ethnic minority groups by gender. The 
percentage of lower educated individuals is notably high for Turks and Moroccans. 
These groups are also concentrated in low occupational levels, which corresponds, to 
                                                 
4 Excluding these two groups facilitates the use of a Heckman selectivity model since non-participant, unemployed 
and self-employed people are not included in the wage data. Additionally, the number of people belonging to these 
two groups is small. Despite this, the selection model is applied because the selection coefficient (λ) is statistically 
significant for some sub-samples and OLS estimations provide similar wage differentials. 
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some extent, to their education level. More than half of women is employed in part-
time jobs, ranging from 56 to 79 per cent for the Dutch and Caribbean respectively. The 
percentage of part-time employment for men is around 25 percent, except for 
Caribbean men (49%). Non-European, Turkish, Moroccan and Caribbeans men are 
more frequently employed in flexible jobs than other men. Further a high percentage of 
Turks and Moroccans is married and has more often children than native Dutch and 
other ethnic groups. It is also notable that the share of divorced women in the work 
force is twice as large as the share of divorced men. It is much higher for Turkish and 
Moroccan women compared to men from same ethnic background. Since the 
participation rate of Turkish and Moroccan women is in general low, this implies that 
especially divorced Turkish and Moroccan women tend to participate in the labour 
market. However, it should be noted that the percentage of married women among 
Turkish and Moroccan, is not low, compared to Dutch women. The percentage of 
married Turkish women is the highest (79%) of all groups, whereas the percentage of 
single women is the lowest among Turkish and Moroccan women (15%) compared to 
38% among native Dutch. Finally, a high concentration of ethnic minorities in 
Amsterdam and Rotterdam is clearly observed. About 40% of Caribbean people work 
in the three largest cities. 
2.2 Wage Differentials 
After the estimation of earnings functions by Heckman’s selectivity model for separate 
sub-samples, the observed wage differential can be decomposed by the standard 
Oaxaca (1973) & Blinder (1973) technique. Since we want to identify the double 
disadvantage of ethnic minority women, i.e. earnings difference between native Dutch 
men and ethnic minority women, an augmented version of the Oaxaca decomposition 
used by Shamsuddin (1998) may be applied. The differentials in the mean log of 
offered earnings between native Dutch male and ethnic minority women is given as 
ln ln
m w m m m w
N I N I I IlnW lnW lnW W lnW W   − = − + −           (4) 
Superscripts m and w indicate men and women. Subscripts N and I indicate native 
Dutch and immigrant groups with 1,2,...,7I = . An alternative specification of double 
disadvantage is given as an earnings gap between native Dutch and ethnic minority 
women plus an earnings gap between native Dutch men and women: 
ln ln
m w w w m w
N I N I N IlnW lnW lnW W lnW W   − = − + −           (5) 
In the standard Oaxaca & Blinder technique, the male or female wage structure is 
assumed to be non-discriminatory wages. Wage discrimination and productivity 
differentials are measured as difference between wages of gender or ethnic groups with 
comparable observed characteristics. However, some theories suggest that 
discrimination not only lowers the wages of disfavoured groups but also leads to higher 
wages for favoured groups. In this context, a number of alternative specifications are 
used to obtain the non-discriminatory wage structure. Since the non-discriminatory 
wage structure is unobserved, it has been derived from estimated coefficients of wage 
functions by using weights. All suggested weights concern shares of ethnic/gender sub-
samples in total labour force. Oaxaca and Ransom (1994), and Silber and Weber (1999) 
compare outcomes of different approaches. Evaluating their findings, Cotton’s 
approach is applied in this study for two reasons. Firstly, the results will be comparable 
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with the earlier study of Kee (1995) on native-immigrant wage differentials for males 
in the Netherlands. Secondly, applying the original Oaxaca (1973) method, taking male 
wage structure as a norm, does not provide very different results5. Surprisingly, the last 
methodology does not produce a larger wage gap due to discrimination for all sub-
samples but the decomposition outcome changes slightly for some groups. Cotton 
(1987) suggests a non-discriminatory wage structure that is sensitive to the relative 
proportions of various types of labour concerned. The unobserved non-discriminatory 
wage structure is given as: *
1
n
i i
i
Sβ β
=
=∑ , where i=1,2,3,…,16 and Si is the relative shares 
of different types of labour,  
1
/
n
i i i
i
S S S
=
= ∑ .  
For our analysis, the non-discriminatory wage structure may be defined, following 
Cotton (1987) and (Kee 1995), as follows 
8 8
*
1 1
m m w w
i i i i
i i
S Sβ β β
= =
= +∑ ∑        (4)
  
where iS ’s are the relative proportions of the sixteen sub-samples, i.e. 8 ethnic groups 
times 2 gender, in the total employment and iβ ’s are vectors of the regression 
coefficients of these sixteen sub-samples. 
Wage differentials between native Dutch and ethnic minority labour force as well as 
between women and men within same ethnic category will be decomposed into two 
components: productivity differentials and wage discrimination (Oaxaca 1973, Blinder 
1973, Reimers 1981, Cotton 1987, Miller 1987, Kee 1995, Oaxaca and Ransom 1994).  
Using the non- discriminatory wage structure, mean offered gender wage differentials 
within same ethnic group is given 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }* *ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆln m w m wm m w m m w w m wi i i ii i i i i i i i iW lnW X X X Xβ β β β β γ λ γ λ − = − + − + − − −    
 (5)   
where superscripts m and w refer to men and women, and subscripts i refers to native 
Dutch and ethnic minority groups,  i = 1,2,…,8.  
Mean offered ethnic wage differentials within same gender 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }* *ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆln ln  j jj j j j j j j m j j jN IN I N N I N N I I N IW W X X X Xβ β β β β γ λ γ λ − = − + − + − − −   
(6) 
 where βˆ  is the vector of the estimated coefficients in earnings equation and iX ’s are 
the mean of productivity-determining characteristics. Superscript j indicates sex 
category, men and women (j=m,w). *β  is non-discriminatory wage structure, which 
functions as the base category to measure wage differentials due to ‘discrimination’.  
                                                 
5 The results obtained from the decomposition based on the assumption of equality of native male wages and non-
discriminatory wages are not presented here but available on request. 
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The intercept term of the regression equations is included the decomposition formula, 
and is treated as an element in the X-vector for which 1m wX X= =  and 1N iX X= =  
for each observation (Cain 1986). Equations 4 and 5 decompose observed wage 
differentials into three components.  
1. Explained differences: these are differences in characteristics of groups 
concerned, given by ˆ ( )i i iX Xβ −   
2. Unexplained differences: these are often attributed to ‘discrimination’ in the 
literature. It is composed by two parts 
2.1. The first term in the brackets refers to the overvaluation of group i 
characteristics, ( )*i iX β β−  
2.2. The first term in the brackets refers to the undervaluation of group i 
characteristics, ( )*i iX β β−  
       3.  Explained differences due to selectivity bias, ( )ˆ ˆii i iγ λ γ λ−  
It should be noted that the decomposition technique would not generate a very precise 
measurement of wage discrimination because not all productivity-determining 
characteristics are available in the data, for instance, motivation and quality of 
schooling. There is also no information about the proficiency of the Dutch language, 
education, and experience in the country of origin for ethnic minorities. 
2.4 Empirical Results 
The earnings functions are simultaneously estimated the selection equations for all sub-
samples. Including education and age as well as three dummy variables for the number 
of children aged 0-5, 6-11 and 12-17 in the selection equations but not in earnings 
functions facilitates the identification of parameters of earnings equation. The 
parameter estimates of the selection equations are not presented here6 since the focus is 
on the parameters of earnings equations.  
The results of the estimations of female earnings functions are presented in Table A.2 
in Appendix. Since the focus is not on coefficients, some selected aspects of estimates 
are discussed in a comparative perspective here. The particular interest is the sign of 
lambda coefficients, which indicate the selectivity effect. A negative lambda coefficient 
suggests that for given observed characteristics, workers who are included in the wage 
and salary sector had lower wage offers than an average individual would have had, 
while a positive coefficient for lambda implies the opposite case. The coefficient of 
lambda is negative for all sub-samples, except Moroccan, Caribbean and Indonesian 
men. However, it is only statistically significant for native Dutch, Turkish and 
Caribbean women as well as for EU and non-European men. The mean selectivity bias, 
the Mills’ ratio7, is obtained from the simultaneously estimations of selection and 
earnings functions to include in the decomposition of offered wage differentials.  
                                                 
6  They are available on request 
7 The Mills’ ratio or inverse hazard,  λj  for each observation j is computed as ˆ( )ˆ( )jj
z
j z
φ γ
γλ Φ= , where φ is the normal 
density and Φ is the standard normal distribution.  
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Experience, tenure and working hours have, in general, a positive effect on the weekly 
earnings of women and men from all groups as expected although the extent and 
significance level of coefficients vary along the samples. The coefficients for education 
dummies may be, in general, low because dummies for job levels depress the effect of 
human capital variables downward. Working in one of the four largest cities, --
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht-- provides significant higher wages for 
native Dutch workers but this is not always the case for workers from ethnic minority 
groups. Having a job especially in Amsterdam and Rotterdam is often a disadvantage 
for workers from ethnic minority groups. Table A.2 presents the estimates of earnings 
functions for women by ethnic origin. With respect to education, university degree 
provides the highest wages for women, except for Moroccan women for whom the 
highest wages are generated by secondary vocational education. Indonesian and 
Turkish women who have a vocational education are worse off compared to general 
education at the same level while women from other samples with a vocational 
education earn the same or higher wages. Compared to flexible jobs, part-time jobs 
provide substantially higher wages for women from all ethnic groups with respect to 
full-time jobs, given the control for hours worked. Even, full-time jobs provide lower 
wages for women from EU and Eastern Europe, and for Caribbean and Moroccan 
women. The public sector pays higher wages for women, in particular for Turkish 
(21%) and Moroccan (17%) women in comparison to the private sector.  
Table A.2 presents the estimates of wage functions for men by ethnicity. Especially, the 
low return to secondary and higher education for Turkish and Moroccan men is notable 
compared to men from the other ethnic groups. Men who are employed in part-time 
jobs have higher weekly wages than those who are employed in full-time jobs in 
comparison to flex jobs. Public sector provides higher weekly wages than private sector 
for men, especially for Turkish (13%) and Moroccan (15%) men, but the advantage of 
being employed in public sector is clearly greater for women than for men.  
The decomposition results obtained by equations (5) and (6), using estimated 
coefficients and mean values of explanatory variables are presented in Table 8.1. The 
upper part of Table 8.1 presents the differences in mean log weekly offered wages 
between men and women for each ethnic group. The lower part of Table 8.1 shows 
mean weekly offered wage differentials between native Dutch and ethnic minority 
workers. The ethnic wage differentials are calculated for men and women separately. 
The decomposition results contain three main components of offered wage differentials 
as given by equations (5) and (6): the wage gap due to differences in average 
characteristics of the groups, due to the parameters of the wage functions, which are 
often addressed to as discrimination and due to selectivity bias. The discrimination is 
approximated by the unexplainable part of the mean log offered wage gap and is 
decomposed into two parts: advantage of favoured group and disadvantage of 
disfavoured group. The favoured group is the samples of males when gender wage gap 
is concerned. It is the Native Dutch sample when the ethnic wage gap is examined. 
Correspondingly, disfavoured groups are women and ethnic minorities.  
The upper part of Table 8.1 shows that the difference in the mean log offered wage gap 
between men and women is largest for Dutch (0.669), Indonesian (0.622), and EU 
(0.597) and the smallest for Caribbean labour force (0.07). A large part of this gap is 
due to differences in observable characteristics. Discrimination explains a relative large 
part of the gender wage differentials for Moroccan (0.099) and Turkish women (0.073), 
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which is mainly caused by female treatment disadvantage. Especially Moroccan 
women are hit by a substantial amount of female treatment disadvantage (0.212). Also 
Moroccan men face the largest treatment disadvantage (0.112) which lowers the gender 
wage gap between Moroccan men and women. The gender wage differentials between 
Caribbean, Non-European and Indonesian workers are reduced by the treatment 
disadvantage of men from the same ethnic group, (-0.047), (-0.045) and (-0.026) 
respectively. The wage discrimination against Dutch women is mainly caused by male 
treatment advantage (0.037 which is 79 percent of total gender wage gap due to 
discrimination). 
Table 1. Decomposition of log weekly offered wage differentials 
 Dutch EU East-Euro
Non-
Europe Turk Moroc Carib. Indon.
Gender Wage Gap (Male – Female) 
TOTAL (A+B-C) 0.669 0.597 0.348 0.449 0.511 0.539 0.070 0.622
A. DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN 
CHARACTERISTICS 0.634 0.562 0.313 0.422 0.437 0.453 0.065 0.678
B. DUE TO DISCRIMINATION (a+b) 0.047 0.067 0.067 0.031 0.073 0.099 0.008 0.003
a) Male treatment advantage 0.037 0.033 0.033 -0.045 0.033 -0.112 -0.047 -0.026
b) Female treatment disadv. 0.010 0.034 0.034 0.076 0.040 0.212 0.055 0.029
C.    DUE TO SELECTIVITY 0.013 0.032 0.032 0.005 -0.001 0.013 0.002 0.059
ETHNIC WAGE GAP 
                                               Dutch male – ethnic minority male 
TOTAL (D+E-F) -0.027 0.176 0.327 0.217 0.441 0.335 -0.119
D.  DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN 
CHARACTERISTICS -0.029 0.151 0.244 0.248 0.303 0.249 -0.184
E. DUE TO DISCRIMINATION (c+d) 0.004 0.065 0.082 0.004 0.150 0.085 0.063
c) Dutch male treatment advantage 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037
d)   immigr. male treatment disadv. -0.033 0.027 0.045 -0.033 0.112 0.047 0.026
F.   DUE TO SELECTIVITY 0.001 0.040 0.000 0.035 0.012 -0.001 -0.002
                                              Dutch female – ethnic minority female 
TOTAL (G+H-I) -0.066 -0.026 0.101 0.165 0.476 -0.217 -0.149
G. DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN 
CHARACTERISTICS  -0.088 -0.073 0.035 0.170 0.286 -0.263 -0.170
H. DUE TO DISCRIMINATION (e+f) 0.024 0.087 0.066 0.031 0.202 0.046 0.019
     e)   Dutch female treatment advant. -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010
     f)    Immig. female treatment disadv. 0.034 0.097 0.076 0.040 0.212 0.055 0.029
I.     DUE TO SELECTIVITY 0.001 0.040 0.000 0.035 0.012 -0.001 -0.002
DOUBLE DISADVANTAGE:  
              (B+E) or (0.047+H) 0.071 0.132 0.113 0.078 0.249 0.093 0.066
 
The middle and lower parts of Table 8.1 show wage differentials due to ethnicity for 
separate gender categories. The components of differentials in the mean offered weekly 
wage between Dutch and ethnic minority male are presented in the middle part of Table 
8.1. Men from Indonesia and EU-countries have a higher mean offered wage than 
Dutch men, generated by their observable labour market characteristics despite a 
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discrimination component, i.e. 0.063 for Indonesian and 0.004 for EU-men. The wage 
gap between Dutch and Moroccan men is the largest among all samples (0.44), 
followed by Caribbean and non-European men (around 0.33).  
The largest part of ethnic wage gaps is due to characteristics. The ethnic wage gap due 
to discrimination is the largest for Moroccan men (0.15), followed by Caribbean 
(0.082) and non-European (0.085), Eastern European (0.065), Indonesian (0.063), 
Turkish and EU men (0.004). The discrimination is responsible for 37% of the total 
wage gap for Eastern European men, for 34% of the wage gap for Caribbean men and 
for 25% of the gap of Moroccan and non-European men. The Dutch male treatment 
advantage accounts for 0.037 percentage points of the average wage gaps. The negative 
sign for Turkish and EU men suggests an overvaluation of their characteristics while a 
negative sign indicates an under-valuation of their characteristics, which is significantly 
high for Moroccan men (0.112). 
The lowest part of Table 8.1 reports the wage differentials between native Dutch 
women and ethnic minority women. A negative sign of mean offered weekly wage 
differentials indicates that Dutch women earn, for the same characteristics, lower wages 
than women from ethnic minority groups, e.g. Caribbean, Indonesian women and 
women from Eastern Europe and EU. This is attributable to the relative high human 
capital endowment of women from these ethnic groups. Effects of discrimination are 
the highest for Moroccan women (0.202) and the lowest for Indonesian women (0.019). 
Since the native Dutch females face a treatment disadvantage (-0.01), discrimination 
against women from ethnic minority groups is completely attributable to treatment 
disadvantage for ethnic minority women.  
The double disadvantage, which measures differences in the average wage offers 
between Dutch men and ethnic minority women, is calculated by using equations 7 and 
8, and is presented at the bottom of Table 8.1. It is especially high for Moroccan 
(0.249), Eastern European (0.132) and non-European women (0.113). This is relative 
low for Indonesian (0.066) and Turkish women (0.078). For women from EU countries 
and Turkey, 94% of the overall double disadvantage is attributable to gender wage 
discrimination, and for Eastern European women, this proportion is 51%. On the other 
hand, ethnicity is responsible for a large portion of double disadvantage for Indonesian 
(0.96), Caribbean (0.91), non-European (0.73) and Moroccan (0.60) women. 
These results indicate the changing attitude of employers with regard to Turkish and 
Moroccan men in the course of time when we look at earlier study of Kee (1995). Kee 
uses a cross-section survey from 1985 to estimate ethnic wage differentials in the 
Netherlands. He reports that discrimination is present against Antillean and Turkish 
men. The mean offered wage level of Antillean men is 10.95 percentage point lower 
than that of the Dutch men due to discrimination. This figure is 6.29% for Turkish men. 
Almost the whole difference between mean offered wages of Dutch and Surinamese 
men is caused by differences in observable characteristics. On the contrary to the Kee’s 
findings, this paper reports a low degree of wage discrimination against Turkish men 
(0.4 percentage point of average wage gap) but a higher degree of discrimination 
against the pooled sample of Surinamese, Antillean and Aruban males (8.5 percentage 
point of average wage gap). Surprisingly, Moroccan men were favoured in comparison 
to Dutch men in Kee’s study, which is the exactly opposite of the findings in this paper, 
showing that discrimination is responsible for 34% of the wage gap of Moroccan men 
with respect to Dutch men. Concerning the gender wage gap for native Dutch workers, 
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this paper confirms the recent study of Bakker et al. (1999) with a low degree of wage 
discrimination against Dutch women with respect to Dutch men (only 4.7 percentage 
point of mean wage gap). They estimate gender wage differentials for native Dutch 
labour using Socio-economic panel survey 1993 and find no evidence that Dutch 
women are substantially underpaid due to discriminatory behaviour of employers. A 
gender wage gap of 0.363 is mainly caused by differences in occupational levels (which 
may reflect discriminatory allocation). 
4. 4 Conclusions 
The ranking of the estimated gender wage gaps along eight ethnic groups in the Dutch 
labour market is as follows. The highest wage gap is estimated among native Dutch 
(.69), followed by the gender wage gap among Indonesians, people from European 
Union countries, Moroccans, Turks, and Non Europeans (.45). No gender wage gap 
was estimated among Caribbeans. Most part of the gender wage gap among ethnic 
groups is explained by differences in characteristics. However within the Turkish and 
Moroccan groups, 14 to 18% of the gender wage is explained due to discrimination. 
Both Moroccan men and women face treatment disadvantage in earnings but this 
disadvantage is higher for Moroccan women than for Moroccan men.  
The ranking of the estimated ethnic wage gaps among men is highest for Moroccans, 
followed by Caribbeans, Non-Europeans, Turkish, East Europeans, people from 
European Union and Indonesians. The part of this ethnic wage gap for men that occurs 
due to discrimination is the highest for East Europeans (37%), followed by Moroccans 
(34%) and Non Europeans and Caribbeans (both 25%). Turkish men do not face 
treatment disadvantage at all. The immigrant male treatment disadvantage of Moroccan 
men is more than double the treatment disadvantage for Non-European and Caribbean 
men. 
The estimated ethnic wage gap among women is in general smaller than the ethnic 
wage gap for men. However the ethnic gap for Moroccan women is slightly higher 
(.48) than the ethnic wage gap for Moroccan men (.44). Furthermore 42% of the ethnic 
wage gap for Moroccan women is due to discrimination (for Moroccan males the 
corresponding percentage was 34%). Women originating from Eastern Europe are 
estimated to have higher wage offers than native Dutch women, which is mostly due to 
their characteristics. However the women from Eastern Europe are second in facing 
immigrant female treatment disadvantage. Although women originating from non-
European countries do not face a high ethnic wage gap (.10), most of this gap is due to 
discrimination (65%).  
From the analyses of ethnic and gender wage differentials we may conclude the 
following. First, the double disadvantage is highest for Moroccan women, followed by 
East European women and Non-European women. The highest ethnic wage gap for 
Moroccans seems to be a reflection of the deteriorating image of Moroccans in the 
Dutch society in recent years. Secondly, the analysis of wage discrimination, which has 
been estimated controlling for occupational status, type of work (part time, flexible) 
and other characteristics affects some ethnic minority groups more than others, and 
may pick up possible discrimination in job promotion. Without these controls, the 
measured ethnic wage gap might have been larger.  
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